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EMINENT DOMAIN: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CRITIQUE
NADIA E. NEDZEL, LL.M.*
WALTER BLOCK, PH.D.**
I. INTRODUCTION
This article offers a legal and economic analysis and critique of
eminent domain doctrine. Section I gives an overview of the historical
development of the concept. Section II continues on to discuss major
cases and problems with jurisprudential trends in the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Takings Clause. Section III provides an economic
analysis of eminent domain from a libertarian perspective. In Section
IV, the article concludes that granting a limited government the power
of eminent domain is unnecessary, ill-conceived, and should be elimi-
nated.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Plato and other ancient Greek philosophers saw no limits on
governmental powers: all ownership interests derived from the ruler's
good favor, which could be revoked at will.1 The concept that go-
vernmental powers should be limited, including a limitation on the so-
vereign's power to take private property, developed out of Western
Christian legal tradition, beginning with the concept that church and
state should be separate. 2 Grotius, the seventeenth century jurist, origi-
nated the concept of "eminent domain." 3 Grotius contended that the
state possessed the power to take or destroy property for the public's
benefit, but he further believed that when the state so acted, it was ob-
ligated to compensate the injured property owner for his losses.4
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1. See generally PLATO, THE REPUBLIC.
2. See, e.g., 22 Matthew 17-21. When asked whether it was lawful to pay taxes, Jesus
replied, "Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are
God's."
3. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.11 (4th ed.
1991).
4. Id.
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Blackstone, too, believed that society had no general power to take a
landowner's private property.
So great... is the regard of the law for private proper-
ty, that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no,
not even for the general good of the whole community.
If a new road ... were to be made through the grounds
of a private person, it might perhaps be extensively
beneficial to the public; but the law permits no man, or
set of men, to do this without the consent of the owner
of the land.5
In practice, however, eighteenth-century colonial legislatures
regularly took private property with little or no compensation, some-
times when the owner had failed to develop his property, but more of-
ten when the legislature wanted to build a public road. The first state
constitutions lacked just compensation clauses, partly because of re-
publican conceptions of property and of rifhts, but also because the
drafters originally had faith in legislatures. Over time, however, the
colonials justifiably lost this faith, and gained a new concern for the
protection of individual property rights. The Vermont Constitution of
1777, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, and the Northwest Or-
dinance of 1787, all revuired just compensation for governmental tak-
ing of private property.
Madison incorporated the concept that a government is morally
obligated to pay for its interference with private property: "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." Thus, the Fifth Amendment imposes two distinct conditions -
two checks - on the exercise of eminent domain: "the taking must be
for a 'public use' and 'just compensation must be paid to the own-
er."'' 1° Originally, this power applied only to the federal government,
but the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, and subsequent incor-
5. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES * 135.
6. William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Com-
pensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L. J. 694, 695 (1985).
7. Id. at 700.
8. Id. at 700-01.
9. Id. at701.
10. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003).
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poration of Fifth Amendment protections, expanded its scope to in-
clude state and local governments as well."
As initially drafted, the United States Constitution did not in-
clude any reference to eminent domain. Nor was the lack of any such
mention of concern to those who objected to the document. James
Madison drafted the Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amendment, in
an effort to increase the chances of constitutional ratification. The pri-
mary concern at the time was that the new federal government would
be too strong, and the Bill of Rights was desired as a further check on
it. Madison added the Takings Clause because he was keenly con-
cerned with protecting private property rights,' 2 and it was adopted in
a slightly modified form with little or no debate in Congress.'
3
Apparently the clause was not considered particularly signifi-
cant because most members of the Constitutional Convention simply
doubted that the federal government would exercise its power of emi-
nent domain and that, therefore, consuming time with discussion of
this trivial concern would make little sense.14 Rather, the debate cen-
tered around whether or not the Constitution should include a Bill of
Rights. Those concerned with the protection of property from the fed-
eral government may have found convincing the argument that Madi-
son advanced in Federalist No. 10. Thus, they may have believed that
the Bill of Rights, and the Takings Clause it contained, was unneces-
sary because the structure of the national government as established by
the Constitution adequately protected property interests and other
rights.' 5 A Bill of Rights was superfluous because it would merely
state that "we should enjoy those privileges of which we are not di-
vested."' 16 The concern on the other side of the debate, however, was
that without a Bill of Rights, and even with one, the powers granted to
the federal government under the Constitution would inevitably lead to
11. See Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co., v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-36
(1897) (holding that the Takings clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
12. See JACK N. RACKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 330-31 (1996).
13. Treanor, supra note 6, at 713.
14. Id.
15. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 835 (1995) [hereinafter "Original Understand-
ing"].
16. JAMES WILSON, SPEECH (Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 184 (Ralph Ketcham, ed., Signet Classic
2003).
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tyranny. 17 Nevertheless, at the time of the ratification, neither side was
particularly concerned with the language of the Takings Clause in-
cluded in the Fifth Amendment.
Ill. EMINENT DOMAIN AS INTERPRETED BY THE COURTS
The Supreme Court has had three main difficulties in interpret-
ing the Takings Clause, as can be seen by examining jurisprudential
trends. The three problems are: (1) deciding when a governmental ac-
tion constitutes a taking; 18 (2) the definition of public use; and (3) the
definition of just compensation. Thus, the Supreme Court has had
problems with all three components of the Clause. In all three in-
stances, Supreme Court jurisprudence has succeeded in enlarging the
government's powers at the expense of private owners. Each will be
examined in turn.
A. Takings
Originally, the understanding of the Takings Clause was that
compensation was required when the federal government physically
took private property, but not when government regulations limited the
ways in which property could be used. 19 In 1922, however, the Su-
preme Court held that compensation must be provided when a gov-
ernment regulation "goes too far" in diminishing the value of private
property. Determining what is "too far" has created a body of law
that recent commentators have described as "a mess."21 The problem is
finding a sensible and stable balance between the individual's right to
enjoy and use his property against the government's interest in protect-
ing and promoting the health, safety, and welfare of the community.
Generally, the Supreme Court has upheld land use regulations
as valid exercises of a government's police power. For example, gov-
17. See THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION
OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-
FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 16, at 237-56.
18. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (Harvard University Press 1985). Roy Whitehead & Walter Block, Envi-
ronmental Takings of Private Water Rights: the Case for Full Water Privatization, ENVTL. L.
REP. 11162-76 (2002).
19. Original Understanding, supra note 15, at 782.
20. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
21. Original Understanding, supra note 15, at 782; Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and
Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279 (1992); Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and
Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 287 (1990).
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ernment may always impose taxes, and can impose other serious bur-
dens without compensation - such as zoning decisions that cause
properties to precipitously lose value, or which create noisy highways
nearby, or which stop an owner from a noxious use. It was against this
background that the Supreme Court considered the case of David Lu-
cas and his South Carolina property.22 Mr. Lucas bought two very ex-
pensive beachfront residential lots, intending to build single-family
homes on them. However, two years later, the South Carolina Legisla-
ture passed a law barring him from erecting any permanent habitable
structures on his land, thus instantly rendering his property virtually
valueless.
23
Reasoning that a regulation becomes a taking if it compels the
property owner to suffer a permanent physical "invasion" of his prop-
erty, or "denies an owner economically viable use of his land," or fails
to "substantially advance a legitimate state interest," the Supreme
Court held that as the law left Lucas's lots without economic value, it
was a taking. 24 In Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Supreme Court similarly
found a taking where a municipal development plan conditioned a
building and expansion permit on an existing business owner's dedi-
cating a portion of her property for storm drainage and for a bi-
cycle/pedestrian pathway. 5 In reaching these decisions, the Supreme
Court developed a new two-part test: in order not to be termed a tak-
ing, a permit condition imposed by a government: (1) must have an
"essential nexus" to a legitimate state interest; and (2) must be "rough-
ly proportionate" to the projected impact of the proposed develop-
ment.
Unfortunately, this rule of rough proportionality has led to a
morass of cases in the lower courts. In one such case, the Maryland
Court of Appeals held that a city's conditioning approval of a subdivi-
sion on its sacrificing of an entire residential lot as a recreational space
was not a taking, a result arguably inconsistent with Lucas and Do-
lan.27 Thus, the new test has led to inconsistent, irreconcilable hold-
ings just as the old one had. There is still no consensus on what consti-
tutes a taking.
22. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006-7 (1992).
23. Id. at 1007.
24. Nicole M. Lugo, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Paving New Bicycle Paths Through the
Thickets of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, 48 ARK. L. REV. 823, 829 (1995).
25. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994).
26. Dwight H. Merriam, What is the Relevant Parcel in Takings Litigation?, in 1999
ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 353, 370 (Deborah A. Mans ed. 1999).
27. City of Annapolis v. Waterman, 745 A.2d 1000, 1012 (Md. 2000).
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B. Public Use
Historically, the courts have employed two interpretations of
the "public use" exception to the bar against governmental takings: a
narrow view and a broad one. The narrow view was that property
could be taken only if it was to be used by the public in general: this
led to the "purpose" line of cases. So, for example, in the colonial era,
one constructing a mill under the Mill Acts was granted the power to
take a neighbor's land if he compensated the neighbor: "[a]pparently,
the contribution of water power to the general well-being and ad-
vancement of the public trumped the rights of the private landown-
er."' 28 This power is more or less identical to eminent domain, and such
expropriations were upheld as public uses as against challenges that
the benefits accrued to private parties.29
In the nineteenth century, many decisions held that govern-
ments lacked the power to permit the nonconsensual taking of private
property for private use, based on natural law theories or on state con-
stitutional language. They held that actual use by members of the pub-
lic was essential for constitutional permissibility.30 Thus, an incidental,
amorphous benefit accruing to the public after taking land and trans-
ferring it to a private party was insufficient to satisfy the "public use"
exception to eminent domain: "public use" meant that the government
controlled the use of the property or that the entire public had a right to
utilize the property in a physical sense.31
However, this "use by the public" standard, which was adopted
by the majority of the states, became difficult to apply due to a variety
of loopholes, limitations, and evasions which courts utilized to allow
expanding industrialization and quick exploitation of natural re-
sources.3 For example, one court found that the construction of a rail-
road satisfied the public use definition, but another reached the oppo-
site conclusion. 33 The Supreme Court was of little help in defining
28. Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain's Political Philoso-
phies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 256-57 (2006); Charles E. Cohen, Eminent
Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development
Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 491, 501-02 (2006).
29. Lopez, supra note 28, at 256-57.
30. Cohen, supra note 28, at 505-06.
31. JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES
§164 (1888).
32. Philip Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20
B.U. L.REv. 615, 618-24 (1940) (giving details of evasions); see also Errol E. Meidinger, The
"Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, II ENVTL. L. 1, 24 (1980).
33. Compare, e.g., Aldridge v. Tuscumbia, Courtland, & Decatur RR., 2 Stew. & P.
199, 203 (Ala. 1832) (upholding the exercise of eminent domain for purposes of constructing a
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public use. Even when the Supreme Court recognized that state court
decisions were a quagmire, the Supreme Court itself used circular rea-
soning rather than a definition: it stated that an irrigation plan which
took land from some farmers to benefit other landowners was consis-
tent with the narrow "public use" definition because "the irrigation of
really arid lands is a public purpose, and the water thus used is put to a
public use." 34 Consequently, critics concluded that the expansive na-
ture of what counted as a "public use" posed a substantial threat to pri-
vate property rights.
35
The second line of cases involved a broader conception of
"public use" by deferring to legislatures' definitions of the term.36
"[W]hen the legislature has declared the use or purpose to be a public
one, its judgment will be respected by the courts, unless the use be
palpably without reasonable foundation." 37 In other words, the public
use is whatever the legislature says it is.
Finally, in its seminal decision Berman v. Parker,38 the Su-
preme Court abandoned the 'narrow' definition of public use entirely,
and defined public use as a generalized benefit to the "public welfare":
"[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary." 39 This decision meant that Berman lost his non-blighted
commercial property which was to be transferred to another private
party simply because it was in an area designated by Congress for re-
development.40 A public agency created by Congress's District of Co-
lumbia Redevelopment Act had been granted eminent domain powers
to acquire blighted areas in DC, and then transfer the condemned
properties to private parties who agreed to initiate projects that con-
formed to their overall redevelopment plan. Berman's business hap-
pened to be in that area, though the premises themselves were not
blighted.
railroad), to Pittsburg, Wheeling & Ky. R.R. v. Benwood Iron-Works, 8 S.E. 453, 467 (W. Va.
1888) (reversing a lower court decision to allow a railroad company to condemn land pur-
suant state statute) (cited in Lopez, supra note 29, at n.132).
34. Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 164 (1896) (cited and quoted
in Lopez, supra note 28 at 263).
35. Lopez, supra note 28, at 260.
36. United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
37. Id. at 680.
38. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
39. Id. at 33.
40. Id. at 34-36.
2007] EMINENT DOMAIN: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CRITIQUE 147
A subsequent Supreme Court case, Hawaii Housing Authority
v. Midkiff,4 similarly allowed the government to acquire land by emi-
nent domain and then transfer it to private parties, though the circums-
tances were unusual: rather than a blighted area determination as in
Berman, Hawaii had determined that a "feudal land tenure system,"
created by Hawaii's traditional aristocracy had distorted the residential
property market, and thus governmental seizure and resale to private
parties was justified.42 In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court fur-
ther entrenched Berman's broad basis for testing the constitutionality
of a taking: "[we] long ago rejected any literal requirement that con-
demned property be put into use for the general public,"43 and the be-
neficiaries of an eminent domain action need not constitute "any con-
siderable portion" of the community.
44
The most recent Supreme Court decision in this line, Kelo v.
City of New London,45 is fully in keeping with the policies developed
under Berman. Like many other New England cities, New London was
experiencing economic difficulties in the 1990s; one of its primary
employers, the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, closed, and the city's
population had diminished.46 A Connecticut state agency identified
New London as a "distressed municipality," enabling the New London
Development Corporation (NLDC) to use its power of eminent domain
to acquire property for development purposes.47 The NLDC decided
that, once acquired, the property would be transferred to Pfizer, Inc., in
the hope that it would be "a catalyst to the area's rejuvenation."A4 Sev-
eral other homeowners challenged the exercise of eminent domain
power as a violation of the Fifth Amendment's "public use" stricture.
In this controversial and fragmented decision, the Supreme
Court asserted it had "repeatedly and consistently rejected" the narrow
test since the end of the nineteenth century. The majority stated that
41. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
42. Id. at 232. Traditionally, an island high chief controlled the land, assigning it for de-
velopment to subchiefs, who would then reassign the land to lower ranking chiefs, who would
administer the land and govern farmers and other tenants. As a result, forty-nine percent of
Hawaii's land was owned by State and Federal Governments, while another forty-seven per-
cent was controlled by the feudal system, causing a severe shortage of land available for hous-
ing.
43. Id. at 244.
44. Id.
45. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
46. Id. at 472.
47. Id. at 473.
48. Id. Pfizer had plans for a $300 million research facility, and the development was to
include a hotel with restaurants and shopping, marinas, a pedestrian "nverwalk," eighty new
residences, a new U.S. Coast Guard Museum, and other office and retail venues. Id. at 474.
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the narrow interpretation had fallen out of favor over the course of
time due to the difficulty of its application and the changing needs of
society: the narrow test required answers to questions such as "what
proportion of the public need have access to the property?" and "at
what price?",49 The City's "carefully formulated" plan was enough of a
public use to justify taking the plaintiffs' properties in order to transfer
them to other private parties because it was designed to create jobs, in-
crease the community's tax base, and provide residential and recrea-
tional use.5°
Dissenting, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, and Justices Scalia, and Thomas, argued that the majority essen-
tially deleted "the words 'for public use' from the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.",51 Justice O'Connor also asserted that the plu-
rality had veered from Berman and Midkiff by upholding an exercise
of eminent domain with only remote public benefits.52 While Berman
and Midkiff involved taking land from private parties and subsequent
redistribution to other private parties, the acquisition of the land led di-
rectly to a public benefit, regardless of the subsequent transfer: a harm-
ful use was eliminated by the taking to remove blight in Berman and to
break the land oligopoly in Midkff,53 but there was no such purpose in
Kelo.
In a separate dissent, Justice Thomas agreed that Kelo erases
the "public use" stricture from the Constitution, but condemned the
majority opinion even more vehemently than had Justice O'Connor:
"[d]efying [the] original understanding that only public necessity could
justify violating the 'sacred and inviolable rights of private property,'
the Supreme Court replaces the Public Use Clause with a '[P]ublic
[P]urpose' Clause, . . or perhaps the 'diverse and Always Evolving
Needs of Society' Clause, a restriction that if satisfied, the Supreme
Court instructs, so long as the purpose is 'legitimate' and the means
'not irrational." '' 54 Justice Thomas then described the public use basis
of the majority reasoning as being against all common sense: a costly
urban-renewal project whose stated public use was only a vague prom-
ise of new jobs and increased tax revenue, suspiciously agreeable to
the Pfizer Inc. 55 Furthermore, Justice Thomas argued, in keeping with
49. Id. at 479.
50. Id. at 483-84.
51. Id. at 494 (O.Connor. J.dissenting).
52. Id. at 500-01.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 506 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
55. Id.
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the Constitution's common-law background, the clause was intended
to be a most-needed limit on the government; the Takings Clause al-
lows the government to take property only if the government owns, or
the public has a legal right to use, the property. Neither the narrow
nor the broad line of cases correctly followed the original, natural
reading of the clause.57
Kelo has resulted in widespread debate on the fiscal and ethical
consequences of using economic development to justify the exercise of
eminent domain. The fiscal concern is that such government-
sponsored redevelopment projects are both costly and unsuccessful. In
other words, the use of eminent domain to take property from one pri-
vate entity and give it to another with the aim of promoting economic
development is counterproductive as well as unconstitutional.58 For
example, the Washington DC redevelopment project at issue in Ber-
man ultimately failed and the legislation creating it was repealed. 59 A
similar project in the Poletown area of Detroit, Michigan involving
General Motors also failed, leaving a strip of abandoned and burned-
out properties instead of the pre-taking busy commercial area. 6' And,
Cincinnati's downtown area gained only a municipal parking lot when
Nordstrom ultimately backed out of a redevelopment plan. The mere
declaration of an eminent-domain-backed redevelopment plan can it-
self lead to anticipatory "condemnation blight" where properties lose
value precipitously in advance of actual exercise of eminent domain
power. Furthermore, it is quite possible that an area considered for an
economic-development taking would improve on its own through
normal market behavior, without the exercise of eminent domain.
56. Id. at 508.
57. Id. at514-15.
58. Art Rolnick & Phil Davies, The Cost of Kelo, 20 FED. RESERVE BANK MINNEAPOLIS
2 (June 1, 2006).
59. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 116, 88
Stat. 652 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5316 (2000); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1450-1451 (sections omitted
pursuant to § 5316); see also JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES
311-14 (Vintage Books 1992) (criticizing urban renewal and public housing programs as "in-
herently wasteful ways of rebuilding cities").
60. See JEAN WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY DESTROYED 30 (1989) (discussing effects
of the exercise of eminent domain on Poletown); Timothy Sandefur, A Gleeful Obituary for
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 28 HARVARD J. L. & PUBLIC POLICY (2005)
(same); see also Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459
(Mich. 1981) (holding the Poletown taking constitutional), overruled by County of Wayne v.
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
61. Dale A. Whitman, Eminent Domain Reform in Missouri: A Legislative Memoire, 71
Mo. L. REV. 721, 757 (2006).
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The ethical concern is that promiscuous redevelopment takings
lead to nefarious overreaching by legislators acting in concert with
large business entities, victimizing private parties and small firms.
Specifically, business interests who want to purchase property for re-
development at low cost will be motivated to persuade legislative bo-
dies to grant them eminent domain support and then use this power to
bully smaller businesses and homeowners. In one such case, when a
landlord refused to allow an expansion, a Target store secured eminent
domain power from the local government and forced its landlord to al-
low the expansion.
62
The reverse is also possible: legislative bodies, greedy for addi-
tional tax dollars, will use indefensible methods to either cause areas to
be blighted or declare them blighted and then grant eminent domain
taking powers simply to raise their tax base.63 One recent case illu-
strates exactly this sort of overreaching, as well as the potential for fis-
cal irresponsibility: a city council allegedly hired first one appraiser
and then another in an effort to have an aging, working class subdivi-
sion in St. Louis declared 'blighted,' so that it could be slated for rede-
velopment.64 The council wanted to replace the subdivision with a
shopping mall in an effort to increase the city's tax income, and so the
World-War II era subdivision was termed 'blighted' despite the fact
that the only problems the appraiser could find were bedrooms in some
basements, front porches which had settled, and some windows were
too small to allow escape in an emergency.65 Despite the fact that the
City Council granted it eminent domain authority, the developer hired
to redevelop the area could not secure financing, and so the project
eventually failed, leaving a number of home owners caught between a
contract to purchase a new home but no purchaser for the old one.66
In response to Kelo and perceived problems posed by the exer-
cise of eminent domain for economic redevelopment purposes, thirty-
two states passed or were in the process of enacting legislation ban-
ning economic development as a "public use" within a year of the Kelo67
decision. Even the United States Congress passed a bill preventing
62. Id. at 736.
63. Richard A. Epstein, Kelo: An American Original, 8 GREEN BAG 355, 359-60 (2005).
64. Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Privatization and Democratization - Reflections on the Power
of Eminent Domain, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 751, 755 (2006) (discussing controversy surrounding
the exercise of eminent domain with regard to a development project in the St. Louis suburb of
Sunset Hills).
65. Id. at 757.
66. Id. at 755-56.
67. See Enacted Legislation, Castle Coalition, available at www.castlecoalition.org/
legislation/passed/index.html (listing post-Kelo eminent domain legislation).
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the use of federal money in connection with a federal, state, or local
economic redevelopment taking where private entities would be the
primary beneficiaries. 68
C. Just Compensation
Theoretically, the Supreme Court has interpreted "just compen-
sation" as requiring that the owner of condemned property be put in as
good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken;69
however, the compensation granted is widely recognized as consistent-
ly under-compensatory. 7
0
Under eminent domain practice, the expropriating agency must
first attempt to purchase the property through voluntary negotiation on
the open market before resorting to condemnation. 7' Nevertheless, the
owner of the property at issue is likely to understand that an eminent
domain action is threatened if he refuses to sell on the government's
terms, and therefore as a practical matter, even this "free negotiation"
has a coercive nature. Once the owner has refused to sell and the agen-
cy brings the threatened action, although the condemned owner is
theoretically due the full economic value of the property taken, prac-
tical difficulties have made it necessary for the courts to develop and
follow working rules to enable determination of that value.72 This par-
ticularly concerns holdout landowners whose actions purportedly
could drive up the price of the property until the government offers
compensation higher than the market price and equal to or greater than
68. Transportation, treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act for FY 2006, Pub. L. 109-
115, Title VII, § 726 (Nov. 30, 2005) ("No funds in this Act may be used to support any Fed-
eral, State, or local projects that seek to use the power of eminent domain, unless eminent do-
main is employed only for a public use: Provided, That for purposes of this section, public use
shall not be construed to include economic development that primarily benefits private entities
.... 1').
69. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510 (1979); United States
v. Miller, 317 U.S. 396, 373 (1943); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934); Camp-
bell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368, 371 (1924); Seaboard Airline R. Col. v. United States, 261
U.S. 299, 304 (1923) (all holding that just compensation requires that the owner be put in sub-
stantially the same position pecuniarily as if he would have been if his property had not been
taken).
70. Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for Reform, 46 S.C.
L. REv. 579, 580 (1995).
71. Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON. 473,
473 (1976).
72. See 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511; United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332
(1949); United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 492 (1973); United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley
Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 280 (1943); Miller, 317 U.S. at 375.
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the value of the property to the government.73 The primary "working
rule" is that of the "fair market value.",
74
Unfortunately, it has been widely recognized that the "fair
market value" scheme fails all three of the basic criteria courts use to
judge whether a compensation scheme is effective: it fails to ensure
that landowners are fairly compensated for their loss, fails to promote
efficient use of the Takings Clause, and does not prevent opportun-
ism.75 Landowners are systematically under-compensated for the loss
of their property. Business owners lose business profits and goodwill,
removal costs, litigation costs, appraisal fees, and demoralization
costs. 76 Homeowners and neighborhoods are uncompensated for any
value that could be attributed to emotional or historical attachment to
the property, in addition to litigation costs, appraisal fees, and any oth-
er indirect costs.
77
Additionally, the market value method is inefficient because
the government cannot incorporate all of the costs associated with the
taking and thus fails to consider opportunity costs. It presumes that the
only costs it will pay are the "fair market value" costs, and fails to take
into account administrative and litigation costs. The former are astro-
nomical: obtaining legislative authorization of eminent domain power,
drafting and filing the complaint, serving process, securing a formal
appraisal, etc.78 Similarly, the latter can also be extremely high. In one
California case, a jury awarded a family who paid $878,000 for their
property $1,070,000, plus $620,000 in attorney fees. 79 Thus, the Tak-
ing cost taxpayers almost twice the value of the property. Third, even
assuming that opportunism - rent seeking (as it is sometimes
termed) 8 - is something to be discouraged, the fair market calculus is
ineffective: generally the fair market value system rules prevent lan-
73. But see Bruce Benson, The Mythology of Holdout as a Justification for Eminent
Domain and Public Provision of Roads, 10 INDEP. REV. 165, 165-94 (2005) (arguing that
whatever the "holdout" demands is the market price).
74. Miller, 317 U.S. at 374; 564.54 Acres, 441 U.S. at 511.
75. Nathan Burdsal, Just Compensation and the Seller's Paradox, 20 BRIGHAM YOUNG
U. J. PUB. L. 79, 82, nn. 14-19 (2005).
76. Id.
77. See id. at 87-88; see also United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 204 (1979)
(holding that appraisal expenses and expert witness expenses are not part of the "just compen-
sation" required by the Fifth Amendment).
78. See Burdsal, supra note 75, at 85, 90; Thomas Merrill, The Economics of Public
Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 77-78 (1986).
79. Burdsal, supra note 75, at 90 (citing Property Rights Victories, THE ORANGE
COUNTY REGISTER, Nov. 26, 2000).
80. See Walter Block, Watch your Language (Feb. 21, 2000) (critiquing this terminolo-
gy), available at http://mises.org/story/385.
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downers from receiving more compensation than the appraised market
value of their property, but encourages opportunistic behavior by ad-
ministrators, attorneys, and litigants.
Moreover, the market value method is a poorly-defined fiction.
Fair market value is properly defined as the price that a willing buyer
would pay a willing seller in the open market. 82 The reality in an emi-
nent domain/taking context is that the willing buyer is the government,
but there is no willing seller.
83
Oftentimes, the state claims it is offering a "fair market
value" for the property it seeks to seize, but this is a
sham. The market price for something is, by definition,
the price that both parties consent to. In a fair market
exchange, each party gives up something he values less
for something he values more, or else he wouldn't agree
to it. It is only through such a voluntary transaction that
we can determine what something's market value is in
the first place. Market value is not universal, but partic-
ular to the assets exchanged in a specific transaction.
For any given piece of property, there can be no market
value without market exchange.
84
Thus, the judicial definition of fair market value for purposes
of an eminent domain taking is confusing, circular, and based on un-
sound economic theory. Consequently, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, the Takings Clause has been distorted: neither taking, nor pub-
lic use, nor just compensation, has any consistent, sensible meaning.
At this point, under the United States Constitution as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, federal, state, and local governments are effectively
free to take or legislate-away any property, pay the owner a paltry
sum, and then resell the property to another private entity.
85
81. Burdsal, supra note 75, at 89.
82. Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); 564.54 Acres, 441 U.S.
at 511; Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 474
(1973); United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961); Miller, 317
U.S. at 374.
83. Burdsal, supra note 75, at 91-92.
84. Anthony Gregory, The Trouble with "Just Compensation," (Dec. 5, 2006), available
at http://mises.org/story/2379.
85. Happily, state and local governments are free to provide protection higher than that
provided in the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court. See supra note 63-64
(discussing post-Kelo legislation); Whitman, supra note 58, at 744 (discussing "heritage val-
ue" measure of compensation as provided by Missouri statutes). But see id. at 758 (pointing
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In part, the antifederalists' fear that we were creating far too
powerful a government has come to fruition. 86 Contrary to Madison's
original intent, due to inconsistent and politically-driven Supreme
Court interpretation, adding the Eminent Domain clause to the Bill of
Rights has resulted not in protecting individuals' rights, but in circum-
scribing them instead. Furthermore, giving the government a vague
power to take property from individuals implies that it is capable of
determining the public good, thus implying that a country is an enter-
prise association with a collective goal.a7 This is contrary to the vision
of at least some founding fathers, such as Madison who viewed the
United States as a commercial republic grounded in a multiplicity of
individuals' interests. 88
IV. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF EMINENT DOMAIN
According to conventional wisdom, some things will simply be
unavailable to us as a society without the governmental employment of
eminent domain. Preeminent examples include highways, pipelines,
railroads, sewer lines, water pipes, and long tunnels. Why? In all like-
lihood, the territory required to build these amenities will be in the
hands of hundreds, and maybe thousands of different property owners.
The odds are that at least one of them will hold out for vast amounts of
money if his land is to be used for this purpose, thus threatening the
entire enterprise. Even those who only somewhat dislike the coercion
necessary to expropriate 89 private property rights are thus likely to ac-
quiesce in such seizures of private property, since for them a world
without such long thin things (LTTs) would be scarcely tolerable.
In contrast to conventional wisdom, in our judgment, a system
based completely on private property rights where all actions are strict-
ly limited to voluntary ones and thus no land seizure is legal is far pre-
ferable to one where coercion is legal, even if the result is that LTTs
cannot be built. In other words, for us the motto "justice though the
heavens fall," 90 is relevant to real world public policy analysis - it
should not be something that merely garners lip service and is not in-
corporated into actual decision-making.
out that the post-Sunset Hills, Missouri legislation would not have benefited owners who had
sold their homes under the mere threat of eminent domain).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
87. MICHAEL OAKSHOTr, ON HUMAN CONDUCT 119, 139, 181, 153-58, 234-5, 286, 315
(Oxford University 2003); see also Hayak, infra note 109, at 94-98.
88. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
89. In Canada, eminent domain is called expropriation.
90. Inscription above the bench of the Georgia Supreme Court.
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Happily, however, it is our claim that this stark choice is not
one that actually confronts us. We do not have to choose between eco-
nomic freedom and LTTs. We can, proverbially, have our cake and eat
it too. We can retain our longstanding appreciation of private property
rights, and, also, have long thin things.
The argument for the necessity of eminent domain goes as fol-
lows: any time anyone starts building one of these LTTs the holdout
problem will arise. Even though there is an obvious benefit to all, say,
5,000 individual property owners from agreeing to take part as a part
owner in the LTT creation, each one has an even greater incentive to
be a holdout, because then he can reap even greater benefits.
Having stated the economic case for eminent domain we now
move to a refutation of it, beginning by showing that potential hol-
douts are not likely to hold out for any length of time. Holdouts are
likely to recognize the following: (1) the gain to be realized by holding
out is minimal; (2) that holding-out will place them in an awkward po-
sition vis-A-vis their neighbors; and (3) that even if they persist in
holding-out, the likely result is a crooked LTT, not no LTT, because
there is likely to be little additional expense to the developer in choos-
ing a less direct route.
A. Holdout Profits
The holdout can reap these even greater benefits only if the en-
terprise goes through to completion. Assume the following values per
acre of farmland, of the 5,000 owners stretching, say, between Louisi-
ana and California, where we are thinking of building our new road.
If LTT is not built $10
If LTT is built $10,000
Successful holdout $1 trillion
Unsuccessful holdout $10
The point here is that the $1 trillion windfall is a will-o-the-
wisp. It is theoretical. It does not exist. It will never take place. If a
holdout insists upon this ridiculous amount, or anything like it, that
will be the end of the project. It simply will not be built.
Therefore, and to the extent to which these 5,000 property
owners (and by extension, all such people) are motivated by greed or
profit seeking, and not by a desire merely to balk the travel plans of
everyone else, this holdout threat is not a serious one as only a small
percent of people are anti social in this way. Similarly, only a small
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percentage of the citizenry engage in serious crimes such as murder
and rape.91 Most people are decent and motivated not only by self in-
terest in terms of maximizing their own profits or revenues, but even
by the good of others or society in general (how else can we account
for the widespread practice of charitable giving in the United States).92
This is perhaps the most important of the points made here. For, if it is
stipulated that most people have an overwhelming desire to become
richer, not a stubborn desire to reduce everyone else's welfare, then
human nature is in favor of LTTs being built under a regime of eco-
nomic freedom (and eminent domain authority is unnecessary).
It cannot be denied that bargaining power will play a role
here. 93 The only point being made at present is that the holdout, if he is
motivated by greed rather than sheer bloody-mindedness, will realize
that if he insists upon the proverbial $1 trillion, he will get nothing
from the LTT, since it will not be built. Thus, he will have to settle for
a more "reasonable" amount for his land. We move, then, from the
horror story of the holdout who prevents the road or pipeline from be-
ing built, to one who is merely trying to maximize the value of his land
holdings. If the developer offers a flat $10,000 per acre for land that
previously was worth $10 per acre, and states that if a single owner
demands more he will build elsewhere, it is entirely possible that even
the limited bargaining power help by each land holder will greatly de-
crease.
B. Peer Pressure and the Holdout's Plight
Consider the plight of the holdout. All the neighbors are posi-
tively hungering for the LTT to come through so that their land can in-
crease in value from $10 per acre to $10,000, in the example given
above. There is this one holdout in town demanding the never to be at-
tained $1 trillion. None of the townsfolk will have anything to do with
the holdout or his family. Yet, still, provided these other people do not
use violence against him, there may well still be some few holdouts,
out of our assumed sample size of 5,000. But this phenomenon, alone,
91. The U.S. has the highest incarceration rate in the world, see study available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/publications/inc-newfigures.pdf; and it
is only 500 per 100,000, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/Glance/incrt.htm.
92. See Giving Statistics, available at http://www.charitynavigator.Org/index.cfm/bay/
content.View/cpid/42 (presenting statistics analyzing the sources of wide-spread charitable
giving in the United States).
93. See generally Adam Clanton, Enforcing Individual Rights in an Industrial World:
Legal Rules and Economic Consequences, 4 GEORGETOWN J. L. & PUB. POL. 165, 165-98
(2006).
2007] EMINENT DOMAIN: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CRITIQUE 157
ought to reduce the number of such holdouts to a more manageable
size.
C. Non-Straight or Crooked LTT's
An alternative way of dealing with holdouts is simply to work
around them, and this is where crooked or non-perfectly straight LTTs
come in. Given that only a very small percentage of the population will
be motivated to holdout through pure malevolence, if by chance one of
them pops up on what would have been a straight LTT route, the de-
veloping company can always choose a more circuitous path.94 That is,
they can build around the holdout's property. This option, in itself, is
likely to discourage holdouts.
There is such a phenomenon as potential competition. The last
thing that the extant railroad wants is a competitor to be built parallel
to his own operation, a few miles distant from his own. Once this oc-
curs, the capital value of his holdings will plummet. Therefore, compe-
tition is in operation even if no such alternative route yet exists. The
present railroad will not likely price too high for its services, 95 lest the
profits earned thereby tempt a competitor to enter the field.
In like manner, the same considerations apply to the would-be
holdout, standing in the way of the LTT development. The last thing
such a property owner would want would be for the road or pipeline to
be sited elsewhere, in a place such that the demand for his own land
would not increase at all. In other words, the holdout faces potential
competition from every other landowner whose property could be used
by the LTT developer as an alternative to his own. This phenomenon,
alone, ought to put something of a spike into the wheels of the holdout.
D. Developer's Expenses in the Absence of Eminent Domain
Authority
No great or inordinate expenses would likely have to be under-
taken by the firm attempting to build the LTT. It could purchase op-
tions to buy land along any given route, at a relatively modest price.96
94. For the argument that private interests will likely be able to build LTTs, and the
government is therefore not needed at least in the case of roads, see WALTER BLOCK,
PRIVATIZE THE HIGHWAYS (forthcoming 2007).
95. We are now assuming a free market environment, where giving bribes to the legisla-
ture to prevent entry of alternative firms is not an option.
96. Walter Block & Richard A. Epstein, Walter Block v. Richard Epstein, Debate on
Eminent Domain, 1 NYUJ. L. & LIB. 1144, 1144-69 (2005).
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Then, if a holdout refused to cooperate, this company could turn to an
alternative route.
Consider Diagram L There are six "curved" paths between the
starting and ending points of our road, in, say, New Orleans and San
Francisco, in addition to the straight one, A. These six are, respectively
B, C, D, E, F and G. The entrepreneur who wants to build a highway
or pipeline between these two cities can purchase options to buy land
at a relatively modest price. If and when he runs into a holdout de-
manding an inordinate price, he merely refrains from exercising his
options along that one route, and simply reroutes.
DIAGRAM I
San
Francisco
E New
~Orleans
G
Diagram II furnishes a variation on this theme. Here, instead of
"curved" alternative routes, there are jagged or crooked alternative
routes as mentioned in the previous section. When a holdout appears
an end-run may in this way be made around him and his property.
Admittedly, this will be more expensive. Assuming the LTT is a pipe-
line, additional pumps may have to be placed at the corners in order to
keep the oil moving. Or, if the LTT is a road, traffic will have to slow
down to accommodate the extra curvature to a greater degree than oth-
erwise on the private road.97 Nevertheless, as long as the present dis-
97. An example of this is kind of rerouting occurred in Worcester, Massachusetts with
the building of U.S. Interstate 290, near exit 11. The road curves around the College of the
Holy Cross which was politically strong enough to "hold out" against the straight line devel-
opment of this thoroughfare that might well otherwise have occurred. See map available at
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counted capital value of these losses is lower than the amount the hol-
dout is demanding for his land, the LTT project will be undertaken.
The additional costs provide an upper limit on what might have to be
paid to the holdout.
98
DIAGRAM II
San
Francisco
E New
In Orleans
http://www.mapquest.com/maps/map.adp?formtype=address&country=US&pop flag=0& lati-
tude=&longitude=&name=&phone=&level=&addtohistory=&cat-&address= l +College+St&c
ity=Worcester&State=MA&zipcode=0 1610-2322.
98. It might be thought that the authors of the present paper look upon the holdout as
some sort of "enemy." After all, but for him, our case would be easy to make that eminent
domain laws are unnecessary in a free society. Nothing could be further from the truth. As it
happens, we look upon the holdout with a certain wry approval. Yes, he can be a pest, but his
presence is emblematic of the essence of private property rights in a free society. For example,
you will never see an edifice constructed under the control of the USSR with a "piece" cut out
of it. All such buildings are squares, or regular rectangles. It is evidence of the relative free-
dom prevailing in the U.S. that every once in a while there will be a high rise edifice with an
irregular base. Sometimes, there is (or was) a little house belonging to a holdout in this space.
Sometimes, an empty lot. In one case on Canal Street in New Orleans, a Sheraton hotel was
built over and around an old drugstore whose owner held out - thus the high-rise was built
lacking a pyramidal section in its base, in which nestled the drugstore. Apparently, when the
owner died, the heirs sold the property to Sheraton, which promptly tore down the drugstore
and filled in the missing piece. Such anomalies bear testimony to protection of property rights
and freedom from contract, two concepts which are bulwarks of commercial success in the
United States.
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E. Extreme Holdouts: The Worst Case Scenario in the Absence of
Eminent Domain
The worst case scenario for advocates of our position that
LTTs can be built by private enterprise without resort to eminent do-
main, is the sort of holdout situation depicted in Diagram III. Here, the
proposed road is to be laid out in an east west direction, and the land
owned by the holdout runs north south, overlapping each and every
one of the alternative east west routes that might otherwise be fol-
lowed by the developer. That is, holding X overlaps routes A, B, C, D,
E, F, and G.
DIAGRAM III
San F
Francisco
E
G New
G Orleans
The first thing to be said about this scenario is that it is an ex-
tremely unlikely one. Any firm economically strong enough to own
such a large parcel of land is unlikely in the extreme to take on the role
of holdout. Much more plausible would be that such an enterprise
would want to become partners with the developer, contributing its
land in return for an ownership share in the LTT. Nor is it reasonable
to assume, at last, that the landowner in this case could hold up the de-
veloper for the theoretical $1 trillion. True, the LTT, subject to what
follows below, cannot be built without the cooperation of the owner of
this strategic parcel, but it is equally true that the development will not
take place if the landowner attempts to obtain the entire profits there-
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from. No, here there will be a bargaining situation, with economic
theory unable to determine each party's shares of the ensuing reve-
nues.
But, even if such a situation were to ensue, the developer is not
without a strategy that will likely overcome the holdout's roadblock.
Assuming the geographical situation makes it impossible for the LTT
to be sited around the holdout's parcel, the developer can still tunnel
under his land, or bridge over it.99 While this would be more expensive
than building a road on the surface it, like the crooked LTT, places an
upper limit on what the holdout can ask as payment for his property:
he cannot expect any more than the cost of this bridge or tunnel. do
F. Precluding: Feasibility of the Holdout's Last Defense
Even in the face of a bridge or tunnel, the potential holdout is
not without a possible response of his own. He could try to homestead
the land above his property,' 0 ' all of it, in an attempt to preclude the
99. Walter Block & Mathew Block, Roads, Bridges, Sunlight and Private Property
Rights, VII JOURNAL DES ECONOMISTES ET DES ETUDES HUMAINES, 351, 351-62 (1996).
100. According the ad coelum doctrine, the owner of surface land also owns territory
stretching below it, in a decreasing cone shape, all the way down to the center of the earth, and
up into the heavens, in an increasing cone shape. But this doctrine is incompatible with the
libertarian principle of homesteading. Walter Block, Homesteading City Streets; An Exercise
in Managerial Theory, 5 PLANNING AND MARKETS 18-33 (Sept. 2002), available at
http://www-pam.usc.edu/volume5/ v5ila2sl/html; http://www-pam.usc.edu/; Walter Block &
Guillermo Yeatts, The Economics and Ethics of Land Reform: A Critique of the Pontifical
Council for Justice and Peace's "Toward a Better Distribution of Land: The Challenge of
Agrarian Reform, 15 J. NAT. RES. & ENVTL. L. 37, 37-69 (1999-2000); Block & Epstein, su-
pra note 96; Walter Block, Earning Happiness Through Homesteading Unowned Land: A
Comment on 'Buying Misery with Federal Land' by Richard Stroup, 15 J. SOC. POL. & ECON.
STUD. 237, 237-53 (1990); HANS-HERMANN HOPPE, THE ECONOMICS AND ETHICS OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY: STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PHILOSOPHY (Kluwer Academic Publishers
1993); JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGIN, EXTENT, AND END OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT, IN SOCIAL CONTRACT 17-18 (E. Barker ed., Oxford University Press 1948); see
ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN (1987); Murray N. Rothbard,
For a New Liberty (1973); Michael Rozeff, Original Appropriation and its Critics (Sept. 1,
2005), available at http://www.lewrockwell.com/rozeff/rozeffl8.html; and thus must be re-
jected in the free society of which we are speaking. After all, the owner of surface land never
came within 500 miles of "mixing his labor" with territory 500 miles below it. For criticisms
of ad coelum, see Rothbard, supra. One practical difficulty with ad coelum is that air flight
would be rendered just about impossible.
101. In the view of John Locke, to homestead virgin territory is to mix one's labor with it,
thereby converting it from unowned to owned status. Another way to look at this matter is to
ask who has a better title to a bit of land: a person who has been fanning it, or someone who
has never been involved in using it at all, in any manner. Clearly, the former, at least in this
view. See Block, supra note 100, at 237-53; Walter Block, Homesteading City Streets: An Ex-
ercise in Managerial Theory, 5 PLANNING AND MARKETS 18-23 (2000); Walter Block, On Re-
parations to Blacks for Slavery, 3 HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW 53-73 (1999-2000); Walter Block,
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LTT firm from bridging over his property, or below, all of it, in an at-
tempt to preclude the LTT firm from tunneling under his property.'
02
This anticipatory homesteading, however, would be very expensive.
For, by definition, the LTT is thin, while the property in question is
anything but. The holdout, moreover, would be like the first speaker in
a debate: however high he built, or however deep he tunneled, the LTT
developer would have the option of besting him in either direction.
The developer only has to homestead land sufficient for his tunnel or
pipeline; the holdout must do so for his entire subterranean property.
Assume that the holdout wishes to forestall the developer, and he
needs a cubic mile to do so. In very sharp contrast indeed, the land
mass needed for the Chunnel was far less per mile of length. Thus, the
developer has a gigantic advantage over the holdout.
Building an underground blocking wall would of course be
cheaper than building an underground cubic edifice, but it would not
suffice, for the developer can work around it. Suppose the wall is
oriented north south. Then, all the builder of the road or pipeline need
do, apart from going under it, is to travel to the end of it, onto someone
else's property with their permission of course, thus obviating the en-
tire purpose of the plane. Think of the Maginot Line.
Consider the situation in the opposite direction: above, not be-
low. The impeder would have to build a wall, say, 30,000 feet high in-
to the air the entire width of his property to stop airplane travel. But, if
so, then the planes could travel at 35,000 feet.
G. The Advantage of the Surprise
The LTT company has another advantage over the potential
holdout: surprise. Only the developer knows where it intends to build.
Walter & Guillermo Yeatts, The Economics and Ethics of Land Reform: A Critique of the
Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace's 'Toward a Better Distribution of Land: The Chal-
lenge ofAgrarian Reform,' 15 J. NAT. RES. & ENVTL. L. 37-69 (1999-2000); Block & Epstein,
supra note 96, at 1144-69; HANS-HERMANN HOPPE, THE ECONOMICS AND ETHICS OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY: STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PHILOSOPHY (1993); N. Stephan Kinsella, A
Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability, 17 J. OF
LIBERTARIAN STUDIES 11-37 (2003); N. Stephan Kinsella, How We Come to Own Ourselves,
Sept. 7, 2006, available at http://www.mises.org/story/2291; LOCKE, supra note 100, at 17-18;
ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN (1987); Michael S. Rozeff,
Original Appropriation and Its Critics (2005), http://www.lewrockwell.com/rozeff/rozeffl8
.html.
102. Block & Epstein, supra note 96; Walter Block, Roads, Bridges, Sunlight and Private
Property: Reply to Gordon Tullock, 8 J. DES ECONOMISTES ET DES ETUDES HUMAINES, 315,
3 15-326 (1998), compare to Gordon Tullock, Comment on 'Roads, Bridges, Sunlight and Pri-
vate Property,' 7 J. DES ECONOMISTES ET DES ETUDES HUMAINES, 589-92 (1996).
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There is only so much the holdout can do to preclude all LTT options.
And, each of these can be highly expensive. For example, it is no acci-
dent that airplanes reached flying altitudes long before anyone thought
to build walls high into the air, in order to be bought off by them. To
be fair, however, this argument is specious because such activities
would not have been accepted by government courts even assuming
such constructions were feasible.
Consider the same argument with regard to downward con-
structions rather than upward. Assume the owner of a roadway of
some 3,000 miles, stretching, say, from Baltimore to Seattle wishes to
adopt the role of holdout against any north-south LTT development
that wishes to pass under its holdings. It will have to begin by building
something or other, down, down, down. How far down? This is un-
clear and highly problematic, since no matter how deeply it claims
land below its surface holdings by such 'homesteading,' all the builder
of the north south amenity has to do is undercut him by a few feet.
10 3
Moreover, and this is the crucial point, the 'defense' will have to pro-
tect a perimeter stretching for the entire 3,000 mile length of the extant
road. 104 In very sharp contrast, all the 'offense' needs is to find one
weak spot: a place along this gigantic distance where either the hol-
dout road owner has not built in a downward direction at all, or has
done so only to a shallow depth. Then, it is game over. Imagine one
football team which has to defend a line 3,000 miles wide, and another
that merely has to break through at any one point,' °5 to get an even
clearer idea of the enormous difficulties placed upon the holdout.
103. By how many feet below person A's land must person B build? The libertarian crite-
rion is that B not interfere with the peaceful legitimate use of A of his property. So, again, we
ask, how many feet below must B build below A's holdings? It depends upon how solid is the
land involved, and what exists on the surface. If we are talking of the island of Manhattan,
which is virtually solid rock, where there are buildings on the surface extending no more, typi-
cally, than 100 feet underneath, then not too far below at all: the rock is strong enough so that
the buildings above will not cave in. If territory near New Orleans is under discussion, then
very deep indeed, as well as the extra cost required to prevent water seepage. For this land is
swampy (query: where have all the swamps gone? Answer: they have been replaced by wet-
lands.) If A has an apple orchard, then B cannot get too close to the trees' roots lest he inter-
fere with their growth. If there are only corn plants there, whose roots do not extend down as
far, then B can build much closer to the surface.
104. We abstract from the possibilities of making end runs up and down either the Atlan-
tic or the Pacific Oceans.
105. Well, okay, not a single geometrical point. Rather, a distance necessary to accom-
modate the north-south LTT. For a pipeline, what is this, ten feet? For a four lane highway,
perhaps one hundred feet, including shoulders.
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H. Specialization and the Division of Labor
Specialization and the division of labor will also give an advan-
tage to the developer, vis-ti-vis the holdout. The onus and expense of
developing new techniques of digging tunnels, and expertise in using
old ones, will rest on the side of the developer, not the holdout. Al-
though this seems at first glance to be an advantage for the holdout,
this is not the case because the LTT developer will likely specialize in
only this type of enterprise, whereas the holdout will be involved, en-
tirely, in a completely different industry; perhaps farming or ranching.
Thus, any technological breakthroughs in tunneling will in all likelih-
ood first and to a greater degree mastered by the former than the latter.
Remember, the ethos of homesteading incorporates, at least po-
tentially, a race between the developer and the holdout to see which of
them can first build real or preventative tunnels or bridges. Given dif-
ferential specialization in this sort of thing, the advantage once again
lies in the direction of society being able to have LTTs without requir-
ing eminent domain laws.
L Feint
But this does not even begin to exhaust all the advantages en-
joyed by the LTT developer in his 'war' with the holdout. All the de-
veloper has to do is make a foray, a feint. He can bruit it about that he
is intending to build a road or pipeline, where he has no intention of
locating. Immediately, under a fully free enterprise system with no
eminent domain and fully wedded to homesteading, all would-be hol-
douts will be sent a-quivering. They must rush to homestead land be-
low their surface holdings, and deeply too, the better to make it im-
possible for the builder to move in that direction without making
payments. This, to say the very least, will occasion vast expenses on
holdouts' part. Let a few instances of this "crying wolf' type activity
occur, and be publicized, where the holdout went to great expense all
for naught, and when the real plan becomes actualized, such people
will think twice before acting in this manner.
Indeed, 'holdout' is a misnomer. It implies that the property
owner who wishes to make a 'killing' by either altogether prevent-
ing, 1°6 or charging a very high price for his land, needs merely to be-
come a 'holdout.' That is, sit tight, do nothing, wait for the LTT de-
106. A thousand pardons. If the holdout totally prevents the LTT, he garners nothing
from his preventative efforts.
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veloper to come begging, hat in hand. Nothing could be further from
the truth. Very much to the contrary, 'holding out' is by far a more ac-
tivist practice. The holdout must initiate a very expensive homestead-
ing effort in order to preclude the possibility of someone going under,
above, or around his surface land holdings. Better nomenclature, in-
stead of holdout, so as to emphasize this activist or initiatory element,
might be 'precluder,' 'forestaller,' 'preventer,' 'prohibiter,' 'rejecter,'
or 'stopper.' 1
07
There is a strong analogy between these sorts of "games" and
the predatory price cutting John D. Rockefeller was accused of in the
1911 antitrust suit against him. 0 8 According to the conventional wis-
107. Getting a "stop" in basketball takes great initiative, talent, and athleticism. It is by
no means a passive accomplishment.
108. Standard Oil began as an Ohio partnership formed by industrialist John D. Rockefel-
ler, his brother William, Henry Flagler, chemist Samuel Andrews, and silent partner Stephen
V. Harkness. See Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The
period following the war of 1861-1865 was a time of unparalleled growth for the American
economy, attributable to several factors: the emergence of national markets for manufactured
products, the innovation of new technologies capable of manufacturing goods in larger quanti-
ties, the generation of vast amounts of capital necessary for financing this growth, and, most
important, a relatively free market economy. Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Anti-
trust - Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?,
62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936, 937-38 (1987). By the late 1870s and early 1880s, companies were
seeking ways to obtain relief from unrelenting competition as well as innovating ways to or-
ganize and manage increasingly giant enterprises. Id. at 939; see generally Standard Oil Co.,
221 U.S. 1; see also GABRIEL KOLKO, TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963). According to most
historians, one such enterprise was Standard Oil, which absorbed or obtained control over
most of its competition in Cleveland Ohio, and then throughout the northeastern U.S., putting
numerous small companies out of business (for the correct view, however, see John McGee,
Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (New Jersey) Case, 1 J. L. & ECON. 137, 137-69
(1958)). Rockefeller pioneered the trust as a legally enforceable way to unify control over a
large number of corporations: trust certificates for common stock in the different corporations
were exchanged among industry leaders, and by virtue of holding this common stock, the trust
gained legal control over member corporations. Often a trust resembled a cartel because it
concerned itself primarily with price and output decisions, not with the firms' actual opera-
tions. Fox & Sullivan, supra, at 940.
Negative reaction to the business trusts led to the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890. Sherman
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988). Although Ohio successfully sued Standard Oil and
compelled the dissolution of its trust in 1892, the company separated off only Standard Oil of
Ohio, without relinquishing control. When in 1899, New Jersey changed its incorporation laws
to allow a single company to hold shares in other companies in any state, the Standard Oil
Trust was legally reborn as a holding company. Eventually, the U.S. Justice Department sued
Standard Oil of New Jersey under the Sherman Act, and Standard Oil was forced to separate
into thirty-four companies, each with its own distinct board of directors. Id. These companies
formed the core of today's U.S. oil industry, including ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, Chevron,
Amoco and Sohio (now BP of North America), Atlantic Richfield, Marathon, and many other
smaller companies. See Standard Oil Co., 211 U.S. 1.
For a critique of all antitrust legislation as incompatible with free enterprise and private
property rights, see William Anderson, Walter Block, Thomas J. DiLorenzo, lana Mercer,
Leon Snyman, & Christopher Westley, The Microsoft Corporation in Collision with Antitrust
166 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 7:140
dom, all the advantages lay with Rockefeller. He could cut prices in
one area, make up the shortfalls from the other divisions of his gigan-
tic corporation. When the local entity was driven to the wall, Standard
Oil would jack up prices there, and use the proceeds to launch yet
another price war elsewhere. But as has been eloquently shown, all the
target had to do was temporarily shut down. In this way the local price
cutter would suffer tremendous losses, and the entire process could not
even get underway.' 0 9 In a similar manner, the advantage here, at least
initially, appears all on the side of the holdout. All the latter has to do,
supposedly, is to costlessly hunker down, and wait to 'pounce' on the
LTT developer. Not so, not so! Thanks to the phenomenon of liberta-
rian homesteading, he must take a far more active and expensive role.
He must preclude the LTT developer from making an end run
(around), an under run (tunnel), and an over run (bridge) around him.
There are not one, nor two, but three margins on the basis of which the
developer can operate. The holdout must defend himself in all these
dimensions, and perhaps for naught.
J. Homesteading
What is the precluding holdout going to do with the land lying
significantly below his surface holdings, in order to demonstrate ho-
mesteading? If he merely empties it, e.g., "builds" a big underground
hole, the LTT may be placed therein, without any harm to the preclud-
er. That may well be his cheapest course of action, but it will avail him
nothing in terms of accomplishing the task he sets for himself. The
tunnel will in no way interfere with the big hole in the ground. °"0 If he
places land mines throughout, making it impossible for anything, ever,
to be built there, he is no longer a holdout, even an active one. Now,
Law, 26 J. SOC. POL. & ECON. STUD. 287, 287-02 (2001); DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO,
ANTITRUST: THE CASE FOR REPEAL (1999); Walter Block, Total Repeal of Anti-trust Legisla-
tion: A Critique of Bork, Brozen and Posner, 8 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 35, 35-70 (1994); Do-
nald J. Boudreaux & Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Protectionist Roots of Antitrust, 6 REV.
AUSTRIAN ECON., 81, 81-96 (1993); Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Myth of Natural Monopoly, 9
REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 43, 43-58 (1996); Tom DiLorenzo & Jack High, Antitrust and Competi-
tion, Historically Considered, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 423, 423-35 (1988); Fred McChesney, Anti-
trust and Regulation: Chicago's Contradictory Views, 10 CATO J. 775, 775-89 (1991);
MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE, (1970); William F. Shugart II, Don't Re-
vise the Clayton Act, Scrap It!, 6 CATO J., 925, 925-26 (1987); Fred L. Smith, Jr., Why not Ab-
olish Antitrust?, REGULATION 23, 23 (1983).
109. See generally John McGee, supra note 108.
110. Can the forestaller object that he wants to "contemplate" the big hole, e.g., use it for
aesthetic purposes? He cannot. See Walter Block, Homesteading, Ad Coelum, Owning Views
and Forestalling (forthcoming).
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he is taking himself out of the realm of a person who wants to cash in
big, by threatening to prevent someone else from building a LTT. He
is violating the libertarian law prohibiting aggression against non-
aggressors. Unless, that is, he posts information attesting to their exact
location, so that the rights of other homesteaders (LTT) are not vi-
olated. But, then, it is always possible for the LTT to dig deeper.
Knowing that, the holdout will be tempted to dig very deep indeed,
sowing landmines as he goes. It goes without saying that this would be
a very expensive proposition, and perhaps unnecessary, if the LTT is
engaging in a feint. It is also a hypothetical so unlikely that it reaches
the absurd and laughable.
K. Optimal Number ofLTT's
It is entirely possible, and even likely, that there will be fewer
miles' worth of LTTs under a regime of full economic freedom than
with rampant statism. It is difficult to see how this can be denied. The
government can, if it wishes, subject an inordinately large amount of
land to expropriation. Its only limit in this regard is that it dare not do
so much of it that it risks its own continued power. Reactions to Kelo
showed that there are limits of tolerance, at least when the land is
turned over to private people pursuing private interests, instead of used
for "public" purposes.
But rational public policy lies not in the direction of maximiz-
ing LTTs. Rather, it is predicated on attaining the optimal amount of
them. The government is likely to overbuild. For example, consider
the case of the 'bridge to nowhere' where a few dozen Alaskans were
to have an entire such edifice built for their own personal use. 112 Com-
pared to that, in the absence of eminent domain powers, the market
will certainly under-build. But what is the optimal amount of LTTs?
As with any such question, the proper answer can only emanate from
the workings of the market.'13 But the free market is defined as the
111. See supra text accompanying notes 47-64 (discussing reactions to Kelo). Of course,
for the radical libertarian, it might be preferable to use land seizure in this way. At least the
land stays in the private sector, always a desideratum. Stephan N. Kinsella, A Libertarian De-
fense of Kelo and Limited Federal Power, Aug. 28, 2005, available at
http://www.lewrockwell.com/kinsella/kinsellal7.html; see also Walter Block, Coase and Ke-
lo: Ominous Parallels and Reply to Lott on Rothbard on Coase, 27 WHITTIER L. REv. 997,
997-1022 (2006); Richard Epstein, Blind Justices: The Scandal of Kelo v. New London, WALL
STREET JOURNAL, July 3, 2006.
112. Ronald D. Utt, The Bridge to Nowhere: A National Embarrassment, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION (2005).
113. See the socialist calculation literature on this vital point: PETER J. BOETTKE,
CALCULATION AND COORDINATION: ESSAYS ON SOCIALISM AND TRANSITIONAL POLITICAL
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concatenation of commercial events based on private property and
economic freedom. How these institutions can be logically reconciled
with expropriation of private property, for any purpose, is difficult to
say.
There are other problems with eminent domain. 1 4 These have
to be set against, on utilitarian grounds, the diminution of land devoted
to LTTs, compared to what would result on the free market. This holds
true even if we take as optimal the mileage devoted to them under
eminent domain (a heroic assumption). In other words, let us say, ar-
guendo, that the ideal percentage of land allocated to LTTs is five per-
cent. Stipulate that under a regime of full free enterprise with no ex-
ceptions for expropriation, only three percent of land will be so used.
And, crucial point here, that with legal land seizure, this figure goes up
to ten percent.
The problem is, this five percent figure has no basis in fact; it is
entirely made up, for purposes of illustration. In the real world, only
the market offers a non-ambiguous optimal allocation of resources. If,
hypothetically speaking, with no government intervention whatsoever,
the market allocates seventy percent of the money spent on chalk and
cheese to the latter, and thirty percent to the former, well, then so be it;
we are justified in claiming that this is the optimal allocation of re-
sources. There is simply no other ratio, such as 60-40 or 80-20 that has
any basis in fact, and on the basis of which we can criticize the mar-
ket's 70-30 decision. Presumably, if either of these two other alloca-
tions were more in keeping with the preferences of the market actors,
there would be forces brought to bear moving society in whatever di-
rection is called for. For example, if 80-20 cheese to chalk were the
extant allocation, and 70-30 the ideal one, there would be profits
earned in cheese, and losses in the chalk industry, until we approached
the optimum.1 5 And the same applies to the 'proper' allocation of land
to LTTs, and for other purposes.
ECONOMY (2001); Richard Ebeling, Economic Calculation Under Socialism: Ludwig von Mis-
es and His Predecessors, in THE MEANING OF LUDWIG VON MISES 56-101 (1993); Friedrich A.
Hayek, Socialist Calculation I, II. & III, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 119-208
(1948); Jeffrey M. Herbener, Calculation and the Question of Arithmetic, 9 REV. AUSTRIAN
ECON. 151, 151-62 (1996); TRYGYE J.B. HOFF, ECONOMIC CALCULATION IN A SOCIALIST
SOCIETY (Liberty Press ed., 1981).
114. Kelo v. City of New London, is only the last in a long line of such cases. Kelo v. City
of New London, 549 U.S. 469 (2005). See Block & Epstein, supra note 96; Epstein, supra
note 63; Kelo, 549 U.S. 469; Kinsella, supra note 100.
115. It is an Austrian economic insight that the market rarely if ever, and if so only tem-
porarily so, settles at. any such optimal point. Rather, tastes and the supply and demand for
substitutes and complements of these two goods is always changing. The market, then, is a
process, which at all times "aims" at congruency between tastes and supply and demand for
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L. Cartels
The argument that LTTs can be built only under a regime of
eminent domain is similar to the analysis of cartel breakup. Yes, each
cartel member has an incentive to join the cartel. Given proper inelas-
ticity in the relevant range, he can do better by cutting back on produc-
tion a bit. However, once in the cartel he has a strong incentive to
"cheat," to get everyone else to cut back, except himself. While en-
couraging others to do so, and acting as if he is going along, but all the
while refusing to engage in any cutbacks on his own, he can garner
even greater profits than by actually fully cooperating in this venture.
In that way he can benefit in two different directions, not just one. He
gains as a cartel member from the fact that every other member reduc-
es productivity, thus raising price by a greater percentage amount than
the loss in quantity. He improves his lot, further, as a cartel "cheater,"
since he suffers no loss in product brought to market; indeed, he can
even increase his output to some degree, as long as he is not so greedy
as to completely counteract the cut backs of his partners.
However, successful cartels do exist: they are called (large)
business firms.' 1 6 Any theory, such as the one that says cartel-like be-
havior cannot survive, is thus rendered invalid. A common argument
holds that cartel action involves collusion. For one firm may achieve a
'monopoly price' as a result of its natural abilities or consumer enthu-
siasm for its particular product, whereas a cartel of many firms alle-
gedly involves 'collusion' and 'conspiracy.' These expressions, how-
ever, are simply emotive terms designed to induce an unfavorable
response. What is actually involved here is co-operation to increase
the incomes of the producers. For what is the essence of a cartel ac-
tion? Individual producers agree to pool their assets into a common lot,
this single central organization to make the decisions on production
and price policies for all the owners and then to allocate the monetary
gain among them. But is this process not the same as any sort ofjoint
partnership or the formation of a single corporation?
Let it not be argued that the analogy between the cartel cheater
and the holdout is not an apt one. The situations are congruent. The
'cheater' and the holdout each attempt to gain ground at the expense of
those with whom, if they cooperate with them, will earn them extra
items, on the one hand, and allocations of them on the other. RICHARD M. EBELING, MONEY,
METHOD, AND THE MARKET PROCESS, (Richard M Ebeling ed., 1990); David Gordon, What
Should Anti-Economists Do?, in THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS IN CONTEMPORARY AUSTRIAN
ECONOMICS (Peter J. Boettke & David L. Prychitko eds., Mises Review 1994).
116. MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE, supra note 108, at 572.
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revenue. The cheater cooperates with the other cartel members, and
then turns around and supposedly stabs them in the back. Precisely the
same is true of the holdout. The only way his land can increase in val-
ue is if the LTT gets constructed. This requires the cooperation of nu-
merous economic actors. And, yet, the holdout slips the knife into all
those others, without whose cooperation the money making LTT can-
not be constructed.
The traditional argument is that a cartel is subject to break up
from two sources. First, the internal cheating previously discussed:
each member has an incentive to look as if he is cutting back on pro-
duction, but not actually doing so. Second, there is outside entry. If the
cartel is successful, profits in the industry will rise. This will attract
newcomers, who are anxious to benefit from this success. But as new
entry occurs, supply will increase, and profits decrease, until the cartel
is no more. However, as Rothbard has shown, given that large firms
are but agglomerations of smaller business entities, it cannot be said
that all cartels fail.' 17
M. Summary of the Economic Analysis
Let our enthusiasm for the LTT developer vis-6-vis the holdout
not be misinterpreted as our favoring of the former in contrast to the
latter. Did you ever see, gentle reader, a high rise building that was not
regularized from a geometrical point of view? Looked at from above,
it appeared to be a circle or a rectangle with a little part cut out of it?
This is an indication that a real estate developer was unable to con-
vince a recalcitrant holdout to sell his property, and went ahead with
construction despite that fact. But a building with a sliver sliced out of
it is a testimony to economic freedom. It is imperative for the survival
of civilization that private property rights be upheld, and allowing hol-
douts to, well, hold out, is a necessary part and parcel of that system.
Our only point is that it is unlikely in the extreme that protecting the
private property rights of the holdout will cost us LTTs.
V. CONCLUSION
The strength of common law is its flexibility and the judi-
ciary's ability to craft different resolutions for different fact patterns,
in contrast to traditional civilian jurisdictions where the only sources
of law are statutes and regulations. However, this very strength can al-
117. Id.
2007] EMINENT DOMAIN: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CRITIQUE 171
so be a weakness when case law leads to inconsistencies and incohe-
rence. Such has been the situation with eminent domain law. Such in-
consistencies and incoherence tend to bring into disrespect all of law.
And yet law and the rule of law is what holds us together as a society.
It is what distinguishes us from the barbarians. If our civilization is to
be protected, at least insofar as jurisprudence is concerned, we must
strive mightily to eliminate, or at least radically to reduce, aspects of
the law that are given to such capriciousness. Expropriation certainly
fits this bill. Nor, the point we have attempted to make in our econom-
ic analysis, is eminent domain necessary if we as a society are to be
able to enjoy the "long thin things" that, presumably, "justify" go-
vernmental takings in the first place. In the absence of eminent do-
main, governments and private entities will still be able to build long
thing things, because holding-out is simply not in any individual's
long-term interest. And even were an individual to hold out due to
pure meanness, the developer is likely to build over, under, or around
his property.
While ancient governments may have been perceived of as all-
powerful, since the Enlightenment, the understanding has been that it
is the people who ultimately hold power, and it is the people whose
rights must be protected. Some of the most important of these rights
include the free market, the right to own property, and freedom of con-
tract. Eminent domain has simply proven to be economically unsound,
incompatible with these rights, and pragmatically unnecessary. It
should therefore be eliminated.
